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CASE COMMENT 
 
Lorna Richardson* 
Commercial Common Sense Revisited: Further Developments in Contract 
Interpretation and Commercial Leasing  
 
In @SIPP (Pension Trustees) Ltd v Insight Travel Services Ltd1  the Inner 
House interpreted a commercial lease and considered, in particular, the use of 
commercial common sense in the interpretive exercise. In doing so the Court 
was clearly influenced by the Supreme Court decision in Arnold v Britton.2 The 
Inner House took a very different approach to the use, and meaning, of 
commercial common sense to that taken in the earlier Inner House decision of 
Grove Investments Ltd v Cape Building Products Ltd3 despite the similar factual 
circumstances.  
While the Inner House’s comments on commercial common sense will likely be 
the focus of discussion of @SIPP, the case also heralded a significant 
development regarding the extent of a tenants’ repairing obligation, holding that 
an obligation to keep leased subjects in good and substantial repair carried an 
obligation to put them into and thereafter keep them in that state of repair. This 
is contrary to what was previously understood to be the position and brings 
Scots law into line with English law on this point. The Court’s decision may 
result in tenants being under significantly greater obligations than were 
anticipated when they entered into commercial leases. 
A THE FACTS 
The reclaimers were landlords of commercial property, which had been let to 
the respondent tenants. The lease had ended. The landlords claimed that at 
lease termination the subjects were not in good and substantial repair, as 
required by the lease. According to the landlords the total estimated cost of 
works to put the premises into the required condition was £1,051,086.25. The 
tenants averred that if they had carried out the works they accepted should 
have been carried out before lease end the capital value of the subjects would 
have been increased by £75,000. Even if they carried out all of the works the 
landlords claimed should be carried out the capital value would be increased 
by £175,000. The tenants claimed that no reasonable landlord would carry out 
the works and, in fact, believed that the landlords did not intend to do the works. 
As such, argued the tenants, the landlords’ claim should be quantified by 
reference to diminution in capital value of the subjects rather than the cost of 
the works. 
The Inner House had to consider two issues. Firstly, whether the tenants’ 
obligation at termination was limited to putting the premises into the condition 
                                                             
* Senior Teaching Fellow in Commercial Law, University of Edinburgh. 
1 [2015] CSIH 91; 2016 SLT 131. 
2 [2015] 2 WLR 1593. 
3 [2014] CSIH 43. See the analysis in L Macgregor, “Crossing the line between business 
common sense and perceived fairness in contractual interpretation” 2015 19(3) ELR 378.  
in which they were accepted by the tenants at lease commencement. Secondly, 
whether the landlords were entitled to payment of a sum equal to the cost of 
putting the premises into the required state of repair, regardless of whether the 
landlords actually intended to carry out the works.  
In terms of the lease the tenants were obliged: 
(Three) To accept the lease subjects in their present condition and at 
their own cost and expense to repair and keep in good and substantial 
repair and maintained, paved… in every respect all to the satisfaction of 
the Landlord and to replace or renew or rebuild whenever necessary the 
leased subjects and all additions thereto and all drains, soil and other 
pipes,… and parts, pertinents and others therein and thereon in at least 
as good condition as they are accepted by the Tenant all to the 
satisfaction of the Landlord and that regardless of the age or state of 
dilapidation of the buildings or others for the time being comprised in the 
leased subjects…..4 and  
(Seven) At the expiry or sooner termination of the…Lease.to surrender 
to the Landlord the leased subjects… in such state and condition as shall 
in all respects be consistent with a full and due performance by the 
Tenant of the obligations herein contained... Provided always that if the 
Landlord shall so desire at the expiry or sooner termination of the 
…Lease they may call upon the Tenant, by notice in writing (in which 
event the Tenant shall be bound), to pay to the Landlord at the 
determination date… a sum equal to the amount required to put the 
leased subjects into good and substantial repair and in good decorative 
condition in accordance with the obligations and conditions on the part 
of the Tenant herein contained in lieu of requiring the Tenant himself to 
carry out the work.5 
B THE EXTENT OF THE TENANTS’ REPAIRING OBLIGATION 
The Lord Ordinary had held that the words “in at least as good condition as they 
are accepted by the Tenant” were key and applied to all aspects of the tenants’ 
obligations therefore excluding any obligation to leave the subjects in any state 
of improvement.6 
Lady Smith gave the judgement of the Inner House. She noted that in 
interpreting the lease the ultimate aim was to determine what the parties meant 
by the language used. This was done by ascertaining what a reasonable person 
with all the background knowledge available to the parties would have 
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understood the parties to have meant.7 Lady Smith noted that the task had 
been “distilled” by Lord Neuberger8 in Arnold v Britton9 who had stated, 
The meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the natural and 
ordinary meaning of the clause, (ii) any other relevant provision of the 
lease, (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the lease, (iv) the facts 
and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the 
document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) 
disregarding subjective evidence of any party’s intention.10 
Lady Smith went on to note the emphasis placed by Lord Neuberger on the fact 
that “commercial common sense should not be invoked to undervalue the 
importance of the language used by the parties in the contractual provision 
being construed”.11 While Lord Neuberger had stated that “poor drafting makes 
it easier to depart from the natural meaning and clear drafting makes it more 
difficult to do so, the court is not thereby justified in embarking on an exercise 
of searching for or constructing drafting infelicities so as to facilitate such 
departure”.12 Lady Smith, again drawing on Lord Neuberger’s comments in 
Arnold v Britton, noted that,  
commercial common sense is only relevant to how matters would have 
been perceived at the time of contracting and is not to be invoked 
retrospectively; and that although commercial common sense is very 
important the court should be slow to reject the natural meaning of a 
provision as correct simply because it seems to be a very imprudent term 
for one of the parties to have agreed, the purpose of interpretation being 
not to identify what the court thinks that parties ought to have agreed but 
what they have in fact agreed.13  
The Court considered the fact that the parties had not appended a schedule of 
condition14 to the lease as weighing significantly against a construction which 
limited the tenants’ obligations.15 The Inner House found that it was clear that 
the natural meaning of the words demonstrated the parties’ intention that the 
overriding, and minimum, repairing standard was “good and substantial 
repair”.16 If the condition of the premises at lease commencement was below 
that standard the tenants had to perform their obligation “to repair and keep in 
                                                             
7 Para [17], citing Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900. 
8 Para [17] 
9 [2015] 2 WLR 1593.  
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14 A record (often including photographs) of the condition of the subjects at lease 
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15 Para [19]. This was also an issue which weighed against the tenants in Taylor Woodrow 
Properties Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 15 Dec 1995, unreported, although it did not 
prevent the Court from finding in the tenants’ favour in McCall’s Entertainment (Ayr) Ltd v 
South Lanarkshire Council (No 2) 1998 SLT 1421. 
16 Para [20]. 
good and substantial repair”, in a way that achieved that standard. 17  The 
obligation “to repair” was indicative of that, but if there was any doubt about that 
the balance of authority18 supported the conclusion that an obligation to keep 
subjects in good and substantial repair carried an obligation to put them into 
that state of repair.19 The position might have been different if there had been 
no obligation to renew, reinstate and rebuild as necessary. 20  The phrase 
“regardless of the age or state of dilapidation of the buildings” confirmed that 
the tenants were not to be excused of their obligation to repair, maintain and 
renew to at least “good and substantial repair” by reason of them being below 
that standard at commencement.21  
C THE LANDLORDS’ CLAIM FOR COST OF WORKS 
Lady Smith noted that the Lord Ordinary had approached his consideration of 
this issue with the observations in Grove Investments Ltd v Cape Building 
Products Ltd22 in mind. The Lord Ordinary had found that “a sum equal to the 
amount required to put the leased subjects into good and substantial repair” 
was amenable to two possible constructions and that the words “in lieu of 
requiring the Tenant to carry out the work” afforded a clear indication that the 
payment obligation was activated only if the landlords intended to carry out the 
works.23  
Lady Smith reiterated that the Court’s task was to determine what the parties 
meant by the language used by ascertaining what a reasonable person with all 
the background knowledge available to the parties would have understood the 
parties to have meant, looking for the natural and ordinary meaning.24 The Inner 
House was satisfied that the only natural and ordinary meaning was that the 
clause was a payment clause; the sum due was the cost of repair; and 
questions of whether and to what extent the premises were worth less in capital 
terms was irrelevant.25 To find that the lease simply provided the landlords with 
a claim for damages, as contended by the tenants, flew in the face of common 
sense so as to exclude it from the possibility of being an alternative 
construction.26  
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18 Credit Suisse v Beegas Nominees Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 803 as followed in Taylor Woodrow 
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Munro 1997 SC 346; and L Batley Products Ltd v North Lanarkshire Council [2014] UKSC 27. 
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for extraordinary as well as ordinary repairs – see Lowe v Quayle Munro Ltd 1997 SC 346 at 
350-351. 
22 [2014] CSIH 43.  
23 Para [26].  
24 Para [36]. 
25 Para [37]. 
26 Para [37], citing Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 and Barclays Bank plc v 
HHY Luxembourg SARL [2011] 1 BCLC 336. 
The Court considered that the case could readily be distinguished from Grove 
given the different terms of the relevant payment obligations.27 Lady Smith 
noted that the Lord Ordinary had read some of the observations in Grove as 
being standalone statements of principle, namely that a contract was a co-
operative enterprise; that a contract should normally be construed in such a 
way as to avoid arbitrary or unpredictable burdens; that the common law often 
serves as a benchmark against which considerations of fairness could be 
measured; and that a radical departure from the common law could indicate 
that a construction was commercially unreasonable. 28  Lady Smith noted a 
number of reservations. First of all, the general observations in Grove ought not 
to be taken as indicating that the considerations of co-operation and mutuality 
that would be appropriate to partnerships or joint ventures applied across the 
board. She continued,  
Commercial contracts may, equally, be hard fought with each party 
intent on securing their own particular objective…. Care must be taken 
to avoid reading anything said in Grove as being to the effect that the 
court can correct a bad bargain or even an unfair one; there is no general 
rule that a commercial contract requires to be fair… It is not legitimate to 
re-write parties’ agreement.29 
Lady Smith also noted, 
the observations in Grove predated the guidance provided by the 
Supreme Court in Arnold and must, accordingly, be regarded with an 
appropriate degree of caution. Finally, it is important to note that Grove 
did not lay down any general rule to the effect that the landlord in a 
commercial lease is, at termination, if repairs are outstanding only 
entitled to be compensated for capital loss actually suffered. Whilst the 
court concluded, in Grove, that that was the outcome that accorded with 
commercial commonsense, the context was its interpretation of the 
relevant clause in that lease…30 
D CONCLUSIONS 
The Extra Division in this case was at pains to distance itself from the decision 
of a differently constituted Extra Division in Grove. Following @SIPP, it is clear 
that Grove does not set down general rules regarding the interpretation of 
commercial contracts,31 or indeed commercial leases, but deals solely with the 
clause in question. @SIPP, following the Supreme Court decision in Arnold v 
Britton, brings the law of interpretation in Scotland and England into line. In both 
cases the Court, while noting that commercial common sense was important, 
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v City of Edinburgh Council [2015] CSOH 29; 2015 GWD 13-234 at para [13] and Richard 
Bishop v 3i Investments plc [2014] CSOH 152; 2014 GWD 33-634.  
sought to set limits on when it could legitimately be used in the interpretive 
exercise.  
The Inner House called into question the statements made by the Court in 
Grove that contracts are co-operative enterprises, entered into by parties for 
their mutual benefit. Lady Smith acknowledged that a commercial contract is 
something which may be hard fought with both parties seeking to secure their 
own objectives. This, it is suggested, is closer to the position with most 
commercial contracts, including commercial leases. Each party is likely to seek 
to agree terms most beneficial to his own interests, without much, if any, 
consideration for the interests of his contractual partner. There is, as Lady 
Smith notes, no general rule that commercial contracts must be fair. The 
decision, in relation to this issue is welcome.  
The Court’s decision on the extent of the tenants’ repairing obligation is more 
doubtful. It is arguable that the clause containing the repairing obligation had 
more than one interpretation and that the interpretation favoured by the Lord 
Ordinary was the most commercially sensible. While the Inner House’s decision 
appears to have been made on the use of “to repair” in the relevant clause the 
Court went on to hold that an obligation to “keep subjects in good and 
substantial repair” carries an obligation to put them into that state of repair. It is 
suggested that this is incorrect. In English law an obligation to keep subjects in 
repair includes an obligation to put the subjects into that state and thereafter 
keep them in that condition.32 This was not thought to be the position in Scots 
law. In Napier v Ferrier Lord Fullerton stated, 
…it appears to me that an obligation to keep the premises in repair 
during the existence of a lease necessarily implies, not an obligation on 
the tenant to put them into repair, but the understanding of the parties 
that they were to be in repair when the lease commenced. That is an 
implication in perfect accordance with the usual common-law obligations 
of a landlord; whereas the other construction, viz . that the tenant is to 
put the premises into repair, is contrary to the usual understanding, and 
would require the clearest expression of intention to support it.33  
Napier v Ferrier does not appear to have been referred to in either the parties’ 
submissions or the decision of the Court.34  
The Scottish cases cited by Lady Smith on this issue did not determine that an 
obligation to keep premises in a certain state of repair includes an obligation to 
put them into that condition.35 The rationale used by the Inner House in @SIPP 
                                                             
32 See eg Proudfoot v Hart (1890) QBD 42. 
33 (1847) 9 D. 1354 at 1360. 
34 There is no reference to it in the official transcript of the case or the reports of the case. 
Napier was referred to in the landlords’ submissions in the Outer House see [2014] CSOH 
137; 2014 Hous LR 54 at para [8].  
35 In Lowe v Quayle Munro 1997 SC 346 Lord Penrose determined inter alia the extent of the 
tenants’ repairing obligation by applying the disregard “regardless of the age or state of 
dilapidation of the buildings” to each of the tenants’ obligations in the repairing clause. In 
Taylor Woodrow Properties Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council, 15 Dec 1995, unreported 
on this issue is unpersuasive. It is suggested that the Lord Ordinary’s analysis 
of this aspect of the case is preferable.36 
The effect of @SIPP is that tenants with an obligation to keep leased premises 
in good condition, when they are accepted in their present condition at 
commencement, will have to carry out improvements to the premises to bring 
them up to good condition and thereafter maintain them to that standard. This 
is likely to be a more onerous obligation than tenants anticipated given what 
was considered the established legal position prior to this decision. 
 
  
                                                             
Lord Penrose was content to follow the English case of Credit Suisse v Beegas Nominees Ltd 
[1994] 4 All ER 803 in deciding that a tenants’ repairing obligation could be triggered despite 
there being no disrepair but that was as far as he went; there was no discussion of the 
difference between Scots and English law on the obligation to keep premises in repair; Napier 
v Ferrier was not mentioned. In L Batley Products Ltd v North Lanarkshire Council [2014] 
UKSC 27 the Supreme Court had to consider whether notice of wants of repair was needed 
to trigger the tenants’ repairing obligation. 
36 See @SIPP (Pension Trustees) Ltd v Insight Travel Services Ltd [2014] CSOH 137; 2014 
Hous LR 54 at paras [11]-[17]. 
 
